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Article 7

TH I' PSYCHOTHERAPIST AS MORALIST
Daniel C. Maguire, S.T.D.

" Th e analyst rapects his patient's personality; he does not try to mo uld it according to his own personal ideas; he is
satisfied when instead of gi ving advice he
can obtain his results by arousing the
patient's own initiative." (Sigmund Freud)

T he death of consensus is a fact
of the contemporary human condition. The field of psychotherapy
exemplifies this. Nevertheless, if
we set aside those therapists who
have succumbed to the simplistic
allurements of a Skinnerian type
behaviorism, we can expect that

the opening citation from Freud
will probably win very general acceptance. No good psychotherapist
should go about imposing his own
personal ideas, especially his own
moral ideas, on his patients. And
the patients should feel confident
that the therapist will not be insinuating his personal moral expectations in the name of therapy.
This would be all well and good
if it were not impossible. Wha~
ever his conscious intentions, every
therapist, to some degree and quite
unavoidably, communicates and
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Imposes his own moral and even
religious valuations on his patients. It is the contention of this
article that this is so, and that therefore it would be well for the
therapist to recognize his actual
role as ethicist and moral counselor
and learn to perform it less badly
or even well. He may, and, indeed
should, revere the ideal contained
in the above quotation from Freud,
but he must acknowledge the reality
of the influentia l value-communication that transpires in multi pie
and subtle ways between him and
his patient.
F irst of all, then, let us elucidate
what morality is so that we,
praiseworthily, might know what
we are talking about. Secondly, it
will be argued that the therapist
is inescapably involved in the
moral condition of his patient.
And finally, some conclusions
will be offered to assist with the
moral aspect o f counselling.
The Meaning of Morality
One reason why therapists may
feel that they can prescind from
moral questions is that they are
unclear about the meaning of the
term moral. This is entirely understandable, albeit regrettable. It
is part of the human problem that
the terms we most use are the
terms we most a buse. False meanings and connotations easily attach to words as they pass through
the vagaries of human discourse.
The term " mora l" is widely used
and abused. In common parlance
and in technical scientific, social,
and philosophic literature, the
term appears with no consistent
meaning.

To some people, mc•ral means
compromising, absoHJte prinl
·!es. To others it rela• s to one's
r I .~ious teachings. It · also used
to , ignify the ideal as )posed to
the hard, practical re ies. And
in a way that is relevant
psychology and psychotherap_ l1e term
in the
moral suffered grievo•
as Posschool of thought kn
iti vism . Positivism wa~
t one of
those philosophies
.se ideas
passed harmlessly t, m journal
to tome with little i ;.1pact on the
concrete world of the li ving. Positivism was not just a school but a
climate-setter. In its climate, many
critical categories of Western
thought took shape.
It was Positivism, for example,
that encouraged the idea that
objectivity was linked to being
va lue-free. T his idea spread with
epidemic force through even those
sciences that should have been
concerned with the discovery and
elucidation of operative value assumptions and judgments. Instead,
the chimeric ideal of " value-freeness" hung over important develo pmental periods of such disciplines
as sociology, education, political
science, and psychology. Psychotherapy did not escape the infectious assumption that good,
scientific practice necessitates a
clean break from the realm of
moral evaluation. Since they grew
up in these shadows, it is •:asy to
understand the uneasiness an~ caginess of the therapist when they
discuss the morality question vis··
a-vis their practice. In the name
of objectivity and good science,
morality is treated as though it
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we re not there. But it is there a '
it is intr i'lsic of personal exister
a nd well •eing.
So wha oes moral n•ean? Bri ·y,
moral m
s human . . . in .he
normati v
sense of that term.
Human
be used descriptive ly,
or norr
vely. For example, it
is hu m
~o be selfish. T his is
descripti
people are often that
way. Nc
tively, however, it is
not hum c.
o be selfish. People
should not
that way. The study
of morality, then, is the study of
what people should and should
not be if they would be truly human.
The moral question arises because, as Nietzsche says, man is a
va luing a nimal. However controlled he may be by nner and
outer determinisms, he is not entirely programmed. Rather, his
agony and his dignity is found in
his capacity to select among the
many values that compete for his
attention a nd selection. Of course,
not all values a re moral values.
For example, there is value in being able to do mathematics, or
in being able to dance o r play
music. But these values are not
moral values because you can lack
them without being less human.
A clumsy person ·might be truly
human, as might a student who
fails in mathe matics. However
sad it is to lack beauty or agility
or particular intellectual skills, it
is not of itself dehumanizing. We
can have some of the values, and
not others and still be thoroughly
human and moral.
It is an entirely different story,
however, if someone claims to be
good at justice but poor at veraci ty.
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It is more than somewhat regrettable if a person is splendidly
courageous but distinctly prone
to murder. Moral values pertain to
a realm of value that is constitutive
of human personhood . They are
not optional. Moral values ar e essential to and constitutive of our
humanness and of our personh ood.
When moral values are at issue,
our humanity is at issue. The mora l
question is utterly serious.
When a moral value is rej ected
with some degree of freedom the
pa in of guilt is experienced. Guilt
is a ripping and tearing experience in which the guilty agent
knows that what he does is in
radical confrontation with what
he is. Action and being are at odds.
What one does contradicts and rejects what one is . Human behavior
should enhance the process of
humanization .
Gui lty
behavior
thwarts that process.
An example might alleviate the
abstractness of this description.
Some primitive peoples studi ed
by anthropologists punish incest
by making the incestuous pa ir eat
from the trough of hogs. The exa mple, however offensive to our
delicacies, is a remarkable symbolization of what we mean by
guilt. The offending couple is
seen as having acted in a beastly
and inhuman way. By way of retribution and to dramatize their
gui lt, they are made to eat in a
beastly and inhuman way. In
various ways, the liturgies of guilt
that are part of every culture attempt to demonstrate this same
point, that the penitent has acted
in a way that is incompatible with
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what he is.
Guilt, of course, can be either
healthy or neurotic. (Therapists
who are only aware of sick guilt,
take heed !) Just as a malfunctioning censoring or warning device
might sound an alarm when no
cause is present. J disturbed person may expel"ience guilt for
activity which is only imagined or
which is mistakenly fe lt to be immora l. The goal of the rapy in such
cases is obvious, howeve r difficult it may be to achieve.
On the other hand, gui lt can be
a normal, healthy reaction to clearly immora l activity. Therapy here,
of course, does not consist in disguising this normal reaction or by
brand ing it a neurosis.
Part of the Freudian legacy to
psychotherapy (to which even
non-Freudian therapists are perhaps unwitting heirs) is the
tendency to see normal and abnormal as existing on a qualitatively
undifferentiated continuum. Therapists should examine their pro fessional consciences on this, particularly with regard to the guilt question. It is good therapy as we ll as
good logic to make distinctions
where there are differences. And
real guilt is not identical with
neurotic guilt.
It should, of course, be noted
a nd granted that healthy gui lt with
which a person does not know how
to cope, can become neurotic izing.
But it could be no less neuroticizing to cater to the illusion that a ll
guilt is sick or unreal. (How a
therapist could purport to deal with
a guilt problem of any kind without entering the field of ethics is
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s1 tething we will retur to mo
n 1tarily.)
lora! va lues, then, ar the distin ive ly human value
People
rna_ vary immensely in ' etermining \vhat is moral and '' .t is immoral but they do not v~: in considering the moral quest t to be
one of utmost gravity.
he behavioral contradiction
moral
human
values induces the bas
phenomenon of guilt. 1 uilt is a
painful and, indeed, .ntolerable
experience. We withdraw from it
as we do from a hot object acc identally touched, immediately
and instinctively. The withdrawal
from guilt is achieved either by behavorial reorientation or by rationalization and self-deception.
But withdraw we must. No one
can think of himself comfortably
as evil.
As a result, every man is a moralist, or, if you will, an ethicist.
(The two terms are, fo r all practica l purposes, synonymous. ) The
task of ethics is to determine true
human values and to discern wh ich
a ttitudes, actions, and omiSSions
are moral or immoral. Scientific
ethics goes about this task systematically by developing a methodology that is as thorough and
as sensitive as possible. The ultimate goal of ethics is to determine
what humanness means. And since
we are not automatically good or
bad, the challenge of ethics ;s addressed to every man and i. this
sense every man is a n ethiciSt.
People get their ethical answers
in various ways. Authority figures
are a prime source . . . parents,
churches, peers. Persons who are
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more secure and reflective mi ·,t
reach et hical conclusio ns n. ;e
independe ntly, through persf 1al
discover~
experience, a nd analysis. Re ,ious persons might seek
1 ightenment
from mysmora l
tical c• nunion with God. But
for thL nost part, people take
mora l · ·ruction from the group
and th r uthority figu res thereof.
How P' 'lotherapy relates to all
of this i·
matter that can now be
discussed.
Morality and Psychotherapy
Carl R. Rogers, in his ClientCentered Therapy writes:
''As we listen to recordings of therapeutic interviews, and study the transscribed material, it is very evident indeed that therapy has much to do with
what is percei ved as 'good' o r 'bad,'
'right' or 'wrong,' 'satisfying' or 'unsatisfying.' It somehow involves the
value system of the individual, and
changes in t ha t system. T his is an aspect
of t herapy which has been little discussed, and thus far barely touched
from a research point of view."

It is at least remarkable that something as basic and as im portant
to a patient as his value structure
could be " thus far bare ly touched
from a research point of view."
And yet, who would dispute Rogers'
observation on this point? If this
phenomenon were to be researched,
one thing that would command attention would be the role of the
therap ist in affecting evaluational
change. Only a therapist who is
beguiled by his own non -directive
rhetoric would believe that he has
had absolutely no directive input
in this development.
Part of the difficulty here is that
psychiatry which has been so attenti ve to the subjective experience
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of subverbal and subconscious
experiences has had too little to
say a bout the subve rbal, subliminal,
and subconscious communication
of these experiences. And yet there
is a growing appreciation abroad
today, which is being fed by a
variety of disciplines, that any conversation is filled with communicatory symbols only some few of
which are words. This would seem
to be especially true in the deep
intimacy
of
psychotherapeutic
conversation.
We can pursue this point by viewing firs t of all the nature of the
client-therapist re lationship, the
authority status of the therapist in
our culture, and the peculiar insecurities generated by the valuational upheavals of contemporary
society.
Psychologist J oseph Nuttin was
expressing what should be obvious
when he wrote in his Psychoanalysis and Personality that:
" ... the therapist's t reatment is not si mply the appl icatio n of a technique; it
establishes between the therapist and
the pa tient a personal relatio nship which
plays a n essential p art in the actua l process of treat ment, and fo r this reason
the whole personality of the therapist,
with his life-conception and his whole
way of looking at things, exerts a n unavoidable influence o n it."

Nuttin elaborates on this by noting, "the discovery, in many d ifferent countries, that in a great
number of cases of loss of psychic
balance, the heart of the trouble
has been found to be bound up with
the problem of the meaning and
content of life." It should be obvious that this concern is also a
mora l concern . It should be obvious too that the patient, given
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tensions th.:tt brought him into
therapy, will have his a ntennae
highly sensitized to a ll signals related to this accute personal and
moral need.
To speak of the meaning of life,
of course, is to speak of something
that cannot enti re ly be ver balized.
In such an experience of meaning,
there is much of the ineffable the
felt, the imagined, and the h~ped
fo r. Abraham Maslow s peaks of
the communication of the ineffable:
" . . . Poetic and metamorphical language,
physiognomic and synesthetic la nguage,
p ri mary process language of the kind
fo und in d reams, reveries, free associations a nd fantasies, not to mention prewords and non-words such as gestures,
tone of voice, style of speaking, body
to nus, facial express ions - all these are
more efficacious in communicating
certain aspects of the ineffable."

How could a therapist silence all
the signals of meta-communication
and im plicit conversation? How
cou ld he turn off his " pre-words
and non-words?" It seems likely
that he could not do so. It seems
that something like "transference"
(without insisting on a Freudian
definition of that term) always takes
place in therapy. At least, it would
be difficult to find a therapist who
would deny that a deep, close,
multi-level relationsh ip develops
in any extended therapy. Such a
relationshi p could not be had without a good deal of commun ication
on matters of basic concern. Otherwise the requisite trust could not
be generated!
Also relevant to the communication between patient a nd therapist
is the authority statu s of doctors
in our society. A doctor today is,
as he was in many primitive so-
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·' ties, something of a rriest. Peo; naturally attribute " ~<;redness "
whate\ L r touches t~· ultimates
h as life and death hese matof ultimate concet
re within
tl', province of docto1 f he signs
of their sacred statu~
~ many.
Doctors seem natu ral
, evoke
the confidence and t
that is
" holy
traditionally reserved
men." They have ar
1sist on
titles. Special vestm•
are associated with the por
image of
a doctor. And polic en give to
doctors the traffic enforcement
courtesies customarily reserved for
the clergy. T hese men who preside
a t the sacred events of birth and
death are not without a sacerdota l
aura.
If this is so, the doctor, and particularly the therapist, should know
that people attribute to him authority that is not limited to the technicalities of medicine. By culture
they are atuned to expect of him
priestly tasks, not the least of which
is moral instruction. Priests are
figu res of d irection, not of nond irection. The doctor may as well
know that divestiture from priestly
status is not easily achieved.
A final factor relevant to clienttherapist communication is the
revolution in values that is taking
place today. Values previously enshrined in consensus are now challenged even by the very authority
figu res who used to uphold them.
Persons who would retain older
sta ndards of morality often find
themselves what sociologists call
"a cognitive minority". Give n the
human need for social support in
knowing as in living, cognitive
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minorities are usually shrill a
nervous.
This p oblem can take anot ·r
form as : does with persons \' •o,
caught ir <he maelstrom, are <.-m stantly s· cing their moral stances.
one would have to look
Years a:
back sc .-a! generations at least
substantially different
to find
view of
tat makes for the good
many persons find
life. To
themselve :n serious disagreement
with their , -.vn moral views of just
a few years ago. This can be highly
unsettling. Many patients in therapy
today have been shaken by one of
these ex periences. It can increase
their need for moral guidance and
moral dependency.
In summary, it would be well
for the therapist to remember that,
whatever the psychiatric specifications of a particular case, the patient is a moral being seeking like
all of us a fuller appreciation of
his human and moral meaning.
Given the nature of human relating, the therapist is speaking in
subtle but influential ways to the
moral questions of the patient.
Therapy does not take place in a
moral vacuum. Both he and the patient should know this.
Conclusions
I. The therapist should recognize
non-directive
counselling
that
(this concept is variously nuanced
and described in the different
schools) is still an ideal. T he goal
must still be, in F reud's words, to
" obta in . . . results by arousing
the patient's own initiative." A
certain mature autonomy in valuing
is the mark of a hea lthy personality.
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Non-directive counselling at its
best is less directive counselling.
But without the ideal of non-directiveness, the moral influence of
the therapist would be even more
imposing.
2. Since the therapist is to some
degree a confessor, he should kno w
what the years have taught Catholic confessors. One mark of the
good confessor is flex ibility. A confessor is taught that he may not,
implicitly or explicitly, impose
his own more rigorous view on an
issue where expert moralists are
at odds. The confessor may feel
that " the opinion favoring freedom"
is disastrously wrong, but he may
not impose his more rigorous
stance if respected moralists find
solid reasons for freedom. Ubi
dubium, ibi libertas (Where there
is doubt, there is freedom) was
the wisdom behind this position.
The practice of the Catholic Church
a lso reflects this wisdom. The
C hurch has not attempted to commit herself infallibly on any pa rticular issue of morality. The reason for this is that moral judgments
of particular issues must be based
not only on a relevant wisdom of
revelation and traditional principles, but also on the mora l meaning of the concrete circumsta nces
of every case. It would take divine
foreknm.~ledge to assess in advance
the moral meaning of every human
situatio n. No one less than God
could attempt to do this, nor has
the C hurch attempted to do it.
(Quite typically and consiste ntly,
Humanae Vitae was published with
a n admission of its fallibility.)
There are many seriously disputed issues of morality today

Linac re Quarterly

where powerful reasons a nd expert authority is found o n both
sides of the dispute. A therapist
with illusions of infallibility on
these issues is just what a patient
does not need. (" Notes in Moral
Theology," by Ric hard Me Cormick, S.J . and Robert Springer,
S.J. appears semi-annually in
Theological Studies. If a therap ist wants to know where ethics
is today, he could begin with these
Notes.)
3. The psychotherapist has a lot
to teach the professional ethicist.
A good deal of ethics involves
moral principles. Few if any of
these principles are self-evident.
They are rather a distillation of
what much empirical evidence
has shown to be tru ly human and
truly moral. Further evidence can
confirm, amend, or even disprove
moral principles. The his tory of
ethics witnesses this. Therapists
have some of that evidence. Carl
Rogers says: "My views regarding
the meaning of the good life a re
largely based upon my experience
in working with people in the very
close and intimate relationship
which is called psychotherapy."
Things about human life will be
learned in therapy that will not be
learned in a library. The professional ethicist should hear those
things. And the therapist should
learn to respect his own expe rience
of what is good even whe n tha t
experience clashes with what mora lists have taught him in the past.
The therapist should be in constant conversation with the mora list and he should know that he does
not come to that conversation

August, 1972

npty-han~ed .

4. Since moral value c •m muni~..a
m unavoidably trans,•'res in a
vchotherapeutic conte· , a furth.!r
c:, • elusion · suggests
self.
At
ti mes a therapist may
ve to disqua lify himself from t. treatment
of a certain patient. If
patient's
moral and religious valu
re totally
opposed to that of tl
therapist
to the point where t'
therapist
sees them as nearly
~urd, the
therapy will probab
generate
more problems tha1 it solves.
Ideally any therapist could treat
any patient. Unfortunately, the
ideal is not always identica l with
the real. If the therapist can completely conceal his own value
orientation (or indiffe rence) he
could, of course, treat any patient.
To do this, however, he would
have to conduct the therapy from
another room and in silence, and
this, obviously, presents other
problems.
All of those who enter the world
of moral counsell ing, the therapist,
the social worker., the moralist,
the clergyman, etc., are treading
upon holy ground. They enter in a
serious way into the sanctuary of
human personhood. When we have
done our best here, we re mai n
unprofitable servants. T here is a
consoling story of a good, old priest
who had helped many with his
counselling and preachi ng. When
he was reminded of this upon his
deathbed, he replied with smiling
wisdom: " I thank God I have done
so little harm!" Would that a ll of
us who treat of the mora ls of men
could merit such a n epitaph. ®.,

175

•

l

.. .

•... ·:.

,.

..

I

•.·

·.·

·, .

I

...
o

1,

• <

• ,Ii.'•

